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ABSTRACT 
Business process reengineering (BPR) continuous to sweep across Europe with 
fervour. The rhetoric of radical performance improvement is too great to ignore 
given the state of many European companies. In many cases the reengineering 
drive has been orchestrated by American companies either moving into Europe 
or implementing strategies dictated from their US base. Yet re-engineering is 
essentially an American concept packaged so as to appeal to that country’s 
psyche. In this paper we examine the transfer of culturally grounded 
management techniques, in this case BPR, making specific reference to the 
German business and cultural context. 
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The Transfer of Culturally-Grounded Management 
Techniques: The Case of Business Reengineering in 
Germany 
At the beginning of this decade a management concept labelled business 
reengineering’ appeared on the management horizon in the US, later spreading to 
Europe and elsewhere. This “new” concept claimed to offer the prescription for 
radical improvement in the dimensions of organisational efficiency, effectiveness and 
adaptability. In contrast to previous management approaches such as just in time 
(JIT), total quality management (TQM), lean production and Kaizen, which focused 
on particular areas of organisational performance such as time or quality, business 
reengineering proported to represent a very well integrated amalgam of the latest 
thinking in management techniques.* However, many initiatives have floundered, not 
so much because the concept is flawed but more so because many organisations did 
not appreciate the tremendous upheaval necessary to migrate from traditional vertical 
structures to a new process oriented architecture (Davenport and Stoddard, 1994; 
Peppard, 1996). 
Significantly, very little research has been conducted with regard to the effects 
of national cultural circumstances upon the success or otherwise of reengineering 
projects. In reality, management theorists and practitioners often fail to take 
cognisance of the cultural grounding of management concepts. This paper considers 
the German business cultural context and assesses the extent to which German 
companies can assimilate the directive of reengineering. Simultaneously it is also 
considers whether a management prescription developed within the US business 
domain can be effectively transferred or exported to European countries. The paper 
’ This paper uses the terms business reengineering and business process reengineering (BPR) 
interchangeably. 
’ For a comparison of BPR with other improvement philosophies see Peppard and Rowland (1995, 
p. 15). 
also identifies the aspects of German business and management practices which might 
be usefully incorporated within the reengineering paradigm. 
The cultural context of management 
Business reengineering, as an American concept, is essentially a product of 
the Anglo-Saxon Classical school of rationalised scientific management thought. In 
fact, most theories of organisation and many of the fundamental and underlying 
principles of management have emerged from under the auspices of the American- 
dominated Classical school. However this traditional economics-influenced school of 
management thought, in a detached and almost aloof manner, often views 
organisations as machine-like constructions without internal politics, personalities or 
people. Human beings are perceived as company “resources” or factors of production 
and managers as detached and highly rational economic agents whose attention is 
solely focused upon profit maximisation. 
In reality, management is a rather social, political and culturally-determined 
process. Furthermore, business takes place in a very diverse world with a mosaic of 
vastly different cultures (both corporate and national) and social systems which 
results in a wide variety of management practices. In other words, management 
practice is very much embedded in, as well as determined and facilitated by, the 
social, economic and cultural environment in which it takes place.’ To a certain 
extent, the validity of a particular management theory or practice may well be limited 
to that theory’s country or cultural centre4 of origin. By the same token, it is unlikely 
that there can ever be a universal management theory or “one true way” to 
organisational design which applies with equal efficacy to all cultural and 
organisational contexts. Moreover, the world-wide success of Japanese and South- 
Business Week recently quoted Marc Blondel, head of France’s Force Ouvriere union, which led a 
strike that crippled the country last autumn ‘[t]he French won’t accept to be managed in an Anglo- 
Saxon manner’ (Javetski et al., 1996, p. 23). 
In a recent book Huntington suggests that the world is divided into a number of different cultures: 
western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Orthodox, Latin American, African and Buddhist. 
He asserts that ‘[clulture and cultural identities . are shaping the patterns of cohesion, 
disintegration and conflict in the post-cold war world . . . Global politics is being reconfigured along 
cultural lines’ (Huntington, 1996). 
Korean firms using techniques at odds with conventional management thought has 
drawn the generally accepted wisdom and universal validity of the hegemonic 
American business schools into question. Hence, it could prove a fatal mistake to 
simply imitate, import and apply an Anglo-Saxon management philosophy to an 
organisation which is based in a significantly different business culture without a 
clear and thorough understanding of that country’s and that organisation’s social, 
cultural and management nuances.’ 
At this juncture the reader may well question the “Americanness” of the 
reengineering discipline. After all, a number of European consultants and academics 
have conducted research and published books in this area. However, a brief survey of 
the concept’s origins and short history will underline that business reengineering is in 
essence an American-created concept originally intended for use in the US business 
environment. 
Business Reengineering: Made in USA 
The concept Business Reengineering’ first surfaced during Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology’s (MIT) extensive research programme Management in the 
19905 which examined the role which IT would play in organisations in the 1990s. 
Simultaneously, researchers and consultants at the Index Group (now CSC Index) 
were conducting parallel research on the link between technology and business 
change. In the Summer of 1990 Thomas Davenport and James Short published a 
paper ‘The new industrial engineering: information technology and business process 
redesign’ in the Sloan Management Review. Following the success of Michael 
Hammer’s article in the Harvard Business Review “Reengineering Work” and his 
best-seller written with co-author James Champy Reengineering the Corporation, the 
reengineering philosophy found itself very much in the focal point of American 
management-thinking. 
For more on the culture-bound view of management see Hofstede 1980 and 1996. 
’ In fact the MIT researchers attached the label Business Process Redesign to the concept. 
One only has to glance through the opening pages of the original edition of 
Hammer and Champy’s best-seller to realise that the clever marketing and rhetoric 
associated with the concept is tailor-made to the specific needs and characteristics of 
the American business culture. Reengineering is proposed as a kind of 
organisational vehicle used in order to emerge victorious from the competitive battle 
with the Japanese. Business reengineering is praised as a sort of secret formula, the 
American retort to Japanese concepts such as TQM, JIT and Kaizen and a means to 
return to former glories “the alternative is for corporate America to close its doors and 
go out of business. . . . Reengineering isn’t another imported idea from Japan” 
(Hammer and Champy 1993, l-2). Furthermore, Hammer and Champy’s rhetoric 
appeals to the old reliable American virtues and plays upon the ideals of the 
“American Dream” and claims that the American culture is uniquely suited to the 
reengineering approach. 
“Reengineering capitalizes on the same characteristics that made 
Americans such great business innovators: individualism, self-reliance, a 
willingness to accept risk and a propensity for change. Business 
reengineering, unlike management philosophies that would have “us” like 
“them” [the Japanese], doesn’t try to change the behaviour of American 
workers and managers. Instead, it takes advantage of American talents 
and unleashes American ingenuity.” (Hammer and Champy 1993, pp. 2- 
3). 
In its purest and most radical form business reengineering possesses many key 
features which can be clearly identified as unambiguous examples of the American- 
dominated classical school of management thought. In its original conceptualisation 
it is results oriented and hence strong on prescription yet weak on implementation 
(Peppard, 1996). In its ‘pure’ form, reengineering’s key tenets included7: 
l An emphasis upon forceful top-down change driven by an omnipotent senior 
executive. 
l The requirement of “clean-sheet” change ignoring existing managerial, cultural 
and organisational circumstances. 
’ See for example Davenport, 1993; Hammer and Champy, 1993; and Morris and Brandon, 1993. 
l The blatant disregard of the wide-ranging and long term impact of change and 
technology on society and business practices. 
l A ruthless, intolerant approach to employee resistance.x 
l A revolutionary, aggressive almost violent tone is closely associated with the 
evangelical rhetoric of many proponents. 
l The patent neglect of the human implications of radical organisational change. 
Hence, business reengineering’s applicability to Germany certainly cannot be 
assumed or taken for granted given this strong emphasis on “Americanism”. In fact, 
given its cultural origins, in the worst case scenario it could conceivably be the case 
that only American corporations are in a  position to reap the full rewards from 
business reengineering’. It is in this context that the authors wish to analyse business 
reengineering’s applicability to the German business environment, a  business culture 
which is sufficiently different to the American in order to justify this undertaking. 
The paper will attempt to determine to what extent and in what form this American 
concept can be best (if at all) transferred to the German business environment. A 
brief overview of German management’s traditional attitude to foreign management  
techniques would at this point be most appropriate 
German Self-sufficiency 
Traditionally, German management  has been characterised by an extremely 
pragmatic and down to earth approach. A unique business system and management  
ethos has developed in Germany since the Second W o rld W a r. One of the most 
striking features of this system has been its self-sufficiency and supreme confidence 
in its own tried-and-tested methods. Although the efficacy of American and Japanese 
business techniques have not always been denied by German management  they are 
not always enthusiastically embraced by German business leaders. In fact, a  report 
conducted by the American consult ing firm  Booz, Allen Hamilton concluded that 
Hammer once noted that ‘we shoot dissenters’ when referring to possible employee resistance. 
‘) Despite the reported success of reengineering, and there are many, US companies have also had 
problems implementing reengineering programmes 
“Germans simply do not have a strong concept of management” (quoted in Lawrence, 
1980). 
Hence, German managers have traditionally been sceptical and extremely 
discerning in their appraisal of “foreign” management techniques.” Perhaps they 
have even been culpable of reinforcing the “not invented here” syndrome. Hence, 
German managers have, for the most part, only used imported management 
techniques where the advantages of these methods can be successfully brought to 
fruition in their particular business environment (Lawrence 1980). 
A sceptical audience turned receptive listeners 
Why then has the reengineering wave swept across Germany with virtually the 
same fervour and vivacity which took American boardrooms by storm?” Essentially 
it is the convergence of a number of key movements which converted the traditionally 
sceptical German management audience into more receptive listeners for 
reengineering’s rhetoric.‘* 
An outdated business and economic system? 
In recent years the German economic and business system has increasingly 
become the target of a barrage of criticism and disapproval. Against a backdrop of 
competitiveness and structural problems, soaring production costs and economic 
stagnation the applicability of Germany’s social-market economics system (Soziale 
Marktwirtschaft) to the present global business environment has been the subject of 
intense debate. Although this debate is essentially taking place at the policy-making 
and macro-level, it does underline that perhaps all is not well with ModeZZ 
” For example, a study in the electronics industry in Germany found that, compared to their 
international competitors, systematic quality measurements such as Taguchi, Quality Function 
Deployment or Value Analysis are carried out less than half as often (Cimento et al., 1993). 
” We estimate that the worldwide BPR consulting market will grow from $5.0bn in 1996 to $7.3bn 
in 1998. 
I2 There has of course been debate in Germany about the merits or otherwise of reengineering. See, 
for example, Gatermann, 1994; Kemp, 1994; Kieser, 1995; Nippa and Picot, 1994; and Osterloh 
and Frost. 1994. 
Deutschland and its Soziale Marktwirtschaft.” One consequence of the Soziale 
Marktwirtschaft has been the profound impact which the resultant high labour costs 
are having on the competitiveness of German companies. Many have chosen to leave 
Germany, moving production to the lower labour cost locations of Asia. 
Interestingly, Mercedes-Benz no longer advertises its products as ‘Made in Germany’ 
but as ‘Made by Mercedes-Benz’. This situation has naturally created an increased 
openness to foreign management techniques and concepts. Business reengineering, 
although American, has offered renewed hope and encouragement to despairing 
managers in Germany, particularly with the rhetoric laden promise of substantial 
performance improvement. 
The efsects of reunification 
Another driver of change has been the consequence of reunification, which 
have been widespread, affecting both the former west and east parts of the country. It 
too has served to push up general production costs as the cost of reunification has had 
to be borne, with the old west Liinder effectively subsidising the former east. 
Massive subsidies paid by west Germans have meant higher taxes, higher interest 
rates, a bigger budget deficit and, therefore, a less competitive economy than they 
would otherwise have had. Currency union and the rapid rise in wages towards west 
German levels, at a much faster rate than productivity, made east German industry 
instantly uncompetitive. It is this very situation which has often led individual 
employers and their workers to circumvent national pay agreements and strike deals 
at a local level to preserve jobs. 
A mindset change 
The original success of the economic miracle or Wirtschaftswunder in the 
decades after the Second World War has created a mindset which is slowly being 
dismantled as reality strikes home. Much of the wealth in Germany today is derived 
from industries where it is no longer competitive. For example, a best practice survey 
in electronics companies carried out by management consultants McKinsey found that 
not only was overall productivity (the value added per employee) of some German 
” The Economist noted recently that Germany’s social-market system ‘is in worse shape than it 
looks’ (May 4th, 1996, p. 19). 
companies in the survey as little as half that of the most successful businesses, but the 
gap in their relative ‘innovation productivity’ was even wider (Cimento et aE., 1993). 
In the emerging ‘knowledge sector’ it is particularly weak. The banking industry, a 
corner stone of the economy, is in turmoil with heavyweights from the City of 
London and Wall Street muscling in on privatisations and mergers. Leading financial 
institutions such as Deutsche Bank can no longer rely on collecting fat fees from 
thousands of large and mid-sized companies by acting as the their personal lender or 
Hausbank. 
The globalisation of management 
The increasingly international nature of the management “profession” has led 
to a more open-minded approach to techniques and methods used in other countries. 
The fact that many managers in large corporations tend to spend significant portions 
of their career on international assignments has fostered a cross-cultural exchange of 
ideas and business philosophies.‘4 Essentially, this international skills-transfer and 
cross-fertilisation of opinions certainly facilitates the communication and import of 
other management philosophies. With experience in the US and in fast-growing 
Asian markets, returning managers have come to view their home country’s business 
practices as backward (Templeman et al., 1996a). 
America: the role-model for European managers? 
American companies have been arriving in Europe since the late 1980s 
ostensibly to get inside “Fortress Europe”. With them they have also brought new 
management practices which, coupled with the changing business climate in Europe, 
has prompted European companies and governments to take a hard look at their 
underlying competitiveness (Javetski et al., 1996). The dominant position of 
American-owned practices in Germany’s DM 10 Billion management consultancy 
market has ensured that business reengineering concepts have been swiftly and 
effectively marketed and distributed in German management circles. Perhaps the pre- 
eminence of American think-tanks (nine of the top ten consultancy firms in Germany 
For example, Gerhard Schulmeyer, the CEO of Siemens Nixdorf is MIT-trained with over 20 years 
of managerial experience in the US and according to Fortune magazine is introducing ‘American- 
style management methods to reinvent Siemens Nixdorf as an American Style company’ (Evans, 
1996). 
are American in origin” has prevented the emergence of reengineering concepts 
specifically tailored to the German business culture. This new-found popularity of 
American techniques is also reflected in the German business press where 
Americanisms such as ‘lean management’, ‘target costing’, and ‘shareholder value’ 
abound. 
The Essence of Business Reengineering 
It must be pointed out that our understanding of reengineering and what it 
entails has developed as preliminary speculations are giving way to emerging 
research results, reality is dismissing myths while practice and greater understanding 
are advancing the boundaries.‘” Notwithstanding the original conceptualisation of 
business reengineering, a rigorous analytical assessment of the concept reveals that 
today the discipline essentially consists of eight key principles or core elements: 
l A radical approach to performance improvement. 
l A clear top-down approach to the management and communication of 
change. 
l A process-oriented view of the organisational. 
l A strong emphasis upon customer-orientation. 
l A progressive approach to the optimum management of human resources. 
l The need for new reward systems. 
l A paradigm of the manager as an inspirational leader. 
l An appreciation of the key role fulfilled by IT in facilitating organisational 
change. 
Below, the applicability and relevance of these core tenets are analysed in the 
specific context of the German organisational and business cultural environment. 
Radical change management in Germany? 
Figures taken from Wirtschuftswoche 9th November, 1995. 
I6 For a perspective on the ‘broadening visions’ of reengineering see Peppard (1996). 
Much of the charm and attraction of business reengineering has been based 
upon the rhetoric-laden evangelical promise of radical and revolutionary 
improvements in organisational performance.” Certainly with any promise of radical 
returns the associated risk is likely to be correspondingly large and in retrospect much 
of this promise was found to be vastly overstated. Hence business reengineering and 
the management of change is, in the transitionary period, associated with much 
uncertainty and a significant degree of risk. Many initiatives have actually floundered 
or failed to deliver the expected benefits. Certainly, the German management system 
does not lend itself to rapid and revolutionary organisational transformation, and a 
more incremental and evolutionary approach to change is required. This resistance to 
rapid change is due to both institutional and psychological constraints and barriers. 
In a range of cross-cultural studies German managers are portrayed as far 
more risk-averse than their American counterparts (Hofstede 1984, 122). In many 
ways the strength of the co-determination system, the emphasis upon formal rules and 
procedures in Hofstede’s so called “well-oiled machine” - the archetypal German 
organisation - and the lengthy training periods are all manifestations of this risk 
avoidance. This deep-seated desire for stability and security undoubtedly does not 
facilitate speedy organisational change and may in fact render gradual and 
incremental organisational change the only option. In fact, one critic (Tixier 1994, 
13) states that it is an “arduous task” to prepare mindsets for change in Germany. The 
problems and difficulties encountered in any change management environment, which 
can be an extremely threatening and disconcerting experience for employees, is 
magnified in Germany. 
Significantly, one American manager who successfully reengineered his 
business identifies the conservatism and resistance to change as the most significant 
barrier to successful business reengineering in Germany (quoted in Gatermann, 1994). 
According to a number of German management consultants the majority of 
” Eccles and Nohria (1992) argue that rhetoric is not incedental to the production of phenomena to 
which the concept of reality is readily ascribed. The inextricable links between language and 
action are very often guided by rhetoric. 
unsuccessful projects can be accounted for by resistance on the part of the employees 
and in particular middle management (Stroetmann et al, 1994, 79-80). 
At first sight, it may well appear that the democratic and participatory 
industrial democracy model of co-determination is ill-suited to business 
reengineering. Certainly in larger organisations it can lead to a protracted and 
difficult decision-making and a lengthy planning process which may initially slow 
down the change initiative (Warner and Campbell 1993, 94). On the other hand, it 
does lead to a much more effective and reliable implementation phase since any 
decision made at board level generally receives a broad base of company-wide 
support (Lane 1989, 237; Wachter 1992, 33). A number of studies (Murphy 1994, 
203; Stroetmann 1994; Picot and Franck 1994, 236) suggest that reengineering 
programmes in German companies take a little longer than the norm to initiate due to 
the necessary consensus building but generally run very smoothly thereafter. 
Hammer himself also praises the not insignificant advantages offered by the system of 
co-determination (quoted in Behrens and Groothuis 1994,73). 
In order to reengineer German enterprises successfully, managers and 
employees must learn how to deal with change as well as how to promote and 
encourage change and transformation. They must also exploit the established system 
of co-determination as an effective vehicle for a conflict-free and considered 
transformation process. 
Top-down or Bottom-Up? 
Closely associated with the revolutionary rhetoric of the American 
reengineering movement is the view that an exclusive top-down orientation is crucial 
to the achievement of radical organisational change. However in the relatively 
collective-oriented Germany business culture any change and transformation project 
requires a broad base of company-wide support. In the light of the powerful German 
unions and the well-developed system of co-determination (Mitbestimmung) 
management and works councils’X (Betriebsr%te) must work together in close co- 
operation. For this reason the dictator-like, all-powerful leader, as envisaged by 
Hammer and Champy would be best replaced by a clever and canny negotiator who is 
also willing to encourage bottom-up communication flows. 
In any case, the traditional and forceful top-down approach generally fails to 
gain employee acceptance and encourage sufficient identification with the project’s 
goals among employees. These shortcomings of the classical top-down approach are 
recognised by many leading German executives. Siemens chairman von Pierer 
admits “I do not thoroughly agree with Mr Hammer’s radical theory - our employees 
are not neutrons but human beings and dialogue is of crucial importance” (quoted in 
Behrens and Groothuis 1994, 69; authors translation). Von Pierer’s Siemens 
colleague Dr. Franz agrees “what we now need is a bottom up movement and a 
change in behaviours and attitudes which can only be generated from the base of the 
organisation.” (quoted in Schmalenbach Telegramm; authors translation). 
Senior management in Germany has traditionally worked with, rather than 
against, trade unions which have a powerful and legally enshrined role in policy- 
making in the larger companies. Numerous studies also support the view that 
Germany’s long-standing co-determination system can be used as a means to build 
consensus-oriented momentum rather than perceived as an impediment to change and 
transformation. This system encourages the use of a participative or bottom-up 
approach from which mutual trust and commitment are generated. It is only within 
the framework of this communicative, consensual climate that an effective, reliable 
and long-lasting transformation can occur. The findings of the COBRA study also 
indicate that Germany’s system of co-determination represents the EU’s most 
participative framework and the labour management relations most suited to 
reengineering and the effective management of change. 
Although recognising the benefits which can be gained from operating with 
the system of Mitbestimmung is of prime importance, significant developments are 
An EU directive has mandated that all large corporations must have works councils in place by 
1999. 
currently taking place with regard to labour management relations in Germany. An 
emerging trend towards flexibility in the labour market, tax breaks and deregulation 
has been accompanied by a decline in union membership and their perceived power. 
Moreover, Klaus Zwickel, head of Germany’s most powerful union IG Metall, has 
recently acknowledged that future contracts will have to offer more flexibility at 
company level). ” If this realignment in the power of organised labour continues 
without the wholesale dismantling of the co-determination system and any ensuing 
chaos, the bargaining position of business leaders seeking organisational change can 
only be strengthened. 
The German experience therefore suggests that a pure top-down approach is 
unrealistic, too scientific, and short-sighted and is unlikely to result in gaining 
widespread acceptance. Building consensus at the outset, while often a slow and 
laborious process, is more likely to result in a successful project in the long-term. In 
this situation the role of the traditional charismatic leader driving the project in a 
dictator like fashion is replaced by someone who is a negotiator and willing to both 
encourage and listen to bottom up communication flows. 
Legacy of Process Orientation 
Of prime importance to the reengineering discipline is the strict focus upon 
the organisation’s key value-creating processes which generally transcend 
organisational as well as traditional functional boundaries. This process orientation, 
so central to business reengineering, is certainly not a concept totally new or alien to 
German management. A number of German management and organisation scholars 
including Nordsieck (1968), Ktipper (1982), Gaitandes (1983) and Picot (1989) have, 
throughout the years, espoused the benefits in terms of organisational efficiency and 
effectiveness which can be achieved by the adoption of a process-oriented view of the 
organisational architecture. In fact, a casual observer could easily conclude that the 
process orientation of business reengineering originates from the German concept of 
“Ablauforganisation”. 
See The Economist 27th January, 1996. 
On a less theoretical level, these principles seem to have entered mainstream 
management practice as indicated by a number of empirical studies. For example, 
German firms are traditionally less functional and hence more task- (i.e. process) 
oriented than comparable British enterprises (Campbell, 1989, 13). Furthermore, 
German companies, by international standards are low on horizontal and vertical 
differentiation and have a relatively flat hierarchical structure (Lawrence 1980, 54). 
Also Peters’ (1992) observations on German mid-sized companies allude to their 
obsession with achieving an excellent operating harmony between the organisational 
structure and key processes and thereby ignoring the Fordist-type ruthless division of 
labour. Significantly, some observers cite gradual improvement of production 
processes as one of the key success factors of German industry (Wachter, 1992, 335; 
Simon, 1992, 116). Furthermore, the proliferation of TQM, continuous improvement 
and Kaizen projects in the past ten years must certainly have heightened the 
awareness of process orientation in Germany even further. However, a recent 
McKinsey study of German electronic firms indicates that many of these enterprises 
are setting less challenging targets than their main competitors (Kluge et al., 1996). 
In short, the existence of a process orientation can only serve to enhance the 
success of BPR projects. Perhaps the ambitious goal setting of BPR can supplement 
the continuous improvement style of the process orientation currently employed in 
German industry. 
Predominance of product focus/ lack of customer orientation 
A prime consequence of the process orientation is a focus on delivering the 
maximum value to the target customer. German products are however world- 
renowned for their high quality design and technological superiority rather than 
subservience to customer needs. This is certainly closely related to the unusually 
high percentage of individuals from engineering backgrounds occupying senior 
management positions and the unusually high percentage of turnover spent on 
research and development. This obsession with engineering excellence does however 
sometimes lead to German firms losing sight of market requirements and future 
market trends. Hence German companies have often been criticised of 
“overengineering” their products (Hickson and Pugh 1995, 99; Kluge et al, 1996, 
147; Simon 1992, 123; Randlesome 1990, 2; 1994, 187; Warner and Campbell, 1993, 
93; Stroetmann et al, 1994, 79). The term “overengineering” essentially refers to the 
design of technically superior yet over-elaborate and over-sophisticated products at an 
excessive price premium.20 This rather naive practice can of course be extremely self- 
damaging in areas where demand is extremely price sensitive. In short, many 
German companies seem to believe that if their product is technically proficient it will 
virtually sell itself.2’ 
Moreover, many German companies, although highly proficient in the areas of 
sales, promotion and the provision of after-sales-service, often lack developed 
marketing skills (quoted in Lawrence 1980, 94). Particularly in the small and mid- 
sized enterprises or Mittelstand, formal market research into customer requirements is 
often neglected in favour of advertising and distribution. In fact, many of these 
companies do not employ full-time marketing specialists or have their own marketing 
departments (Hickson and Pugh 1995,99). Many even rely upon outdated and highly 
illogical pricing strategies such as the Cost-plus pricing method (Simon 1992, 122). 
Furthermore, according to a study by a German consultancy, marketing specialists 
often fail to communicate effectively customer requirements to their colleagues in 
other departments such as R&D and production. ” In fact, only one in seven German 
firms encourages significant customer contributions to product development. 
Moreover, according to two independent studies of German reengineering projects, a 
large number of programmes failed due to the lack of focus on current customer needs 
(Picot and Biihme 1994, 233; Wirtschaftswoche 22.5.1995). Significantly, in only 
five of the twenty seven surveyed projects were customers directly involved in the 
programme-planning. 
” Womack and Jones (1996) note that during their research, doubts which they often registered 
regarding proposed products were often countered with claims that “the customer will want it once 
we explain it”, while recent product failures were often explained away as instances where “the 
customers weren’t sophisticated enough to grasp the merits of the product’ (p. 17). 
” Mr. Michael Fuchs, the president of Germany’s wholesale and foreign trade association, recently 
said that German companies are losing lucrative niche markets because the Internet has made it 
easier to compare prices and so was increasing competition (Financial Times, March 27th, 1996). 
” See Wirtschafiswoche 4th May 1995. 
Business reengineering, with its strong customer orientation is, for this reason, 
perhaps badly needed in Germany order to eliminate these deficiencies. By the same 
token, the danger which a lack of customer orientation can lead to should equally be 
recognised by any would-be reengineers. 
The Management of Human Resources 
In a reengineered environment the optimum use of the company’s human 
resources is perceived as crucial to the organisation’s success. The reengineering 
literature stresses the need for well-educated, highly-qualified, flexible, self- 
motivating employees who cherish responsibility and are willing to continuously 
learn and supplement their skill-base. Concepts such as empowerment, teamwork and 
continuous learning are all at the core of the reengineering philosophy. Although it is 
not clear whether any pool of labour meets this utopian profile, the German work 
force seems well ahead of the field. The German work-force is famed for its Fleiss 
(assiduity) and efficiency and was certainly a building block of Germany’s 
Wirtschaftswunder, whilst the dual system (Das duale Ausbildungssystem) of 
education has been a proverbial conveyor belt of capable workers.23 For example, 
120,000 workers gain highly respected engineering qualifications24 annually (Warner 
and Campbell 1993,98). 
Although the German education system produces thousands of very well- 
qualified employees annually, it is not without fault. It could well be the case that the 
system is inflexible and rigid and that too much emphasis is placed upon the 
acquisition of formal and specialist qualifications. This system excels at producing 
technical and functional specialists (Randlesome 1994, 156) yet it is doubtful whether 
these specialists can always effectively fulfil the role of the adaptable and flexible 
generalist required under the business reengineering paradigm. The greatest 
There is some evidence that Germany’s comprehensive vocational training program is unraveling 
(See Lowry Miller and Anhalt, 1996). 
*4 Engineering is a protected qualification in Germany; those proporting to hold the title must have 
attended university or polytechnic. 
weakness of the university education system probably relates to the average duration 
of study (five to seven years) and subsequent lack of “fast-track” university graduates. 
Significantly, German workers generally already enjoy a relatively high 
degree of autonomy and empowerment (Lane 1989, 42). Correspondingly, the power 
distance between employees and management is, by international standards, quite low 
(Hofstede 1984, 77). Likewise, it is very much the norm to incorporate specialist and 
technical knowledge in line staff and workers rather than to depend upon additional 
staff specialists (Lawrence 1980, 50). It is in fact the creativity and autonomy of 
German workers which is considered one of the key success factors of Germany’s car, 
engineering and chemical sectors (Kern and Schumann 1987, 160). This trend is 
perhaps most perceptible among the Mittelstand (medium-sized and smaall 
companies) who value empowered and highly motivated employees as crucial to their 
long-term success (Simon 1992, 122). 
As outlined above teamwork and co-operation within and between groups is 
central to the new organisational paradigm. This is, to a certain extent, surprising 
given that the USA is considered the most individualistic society in the world. 
Germany is regarded by Western standards, as a relatively collective society and 
certainly far less individualistic than the US (Hofstede 199 1, 232). 
A Cranfield School of Management study on European management style 
terms the German style “towards a common goal” (Myers et al, 1995). This is very 
much a reflection of German society’s preference for the pursuit of common goals by 
collective effort. Within German organisations effective team performance is 
achieved by close co-operation between members of different hierarchical levels 
(Wachter, 1992, 332; Smyser 1993, 71). Similarly, co-operative relationships 
between white and blue collar workers underline this emphasis on teamwork and 
collectiveness. The only weakness in this regard is the lack of well-integrated multi- 
functional project teams, partly due to the insufficient job rotation schemes in many 
German organisations (Kluge et al., 1996, 146). The transition from a largely 
function-oriented structure to teamwork has however not been achieved without 
growing pains in many organisations. Many organisations including Opel and 
Hewlett Packard have experienced some difficulty encouraging the concept of 
teamwork in their German operations ( Wirtschaftswoche, 27.10.1994). 
Despite certain shortcomings, one must conclude that all considered the 
talented pool of labour available to German companies is an invaluable asset. In fact, 
Ostermann (1991, 241), documenting the results of the MIT “Management in the 
1990s Programme”, cites the German work-force as being an ideal base for 
reengineering projects. 
Management Style 
The profile of the ideal manager, as outlined in the business reengineering 
literature is that of a flexible generalist who motivates and acts as a coach, mentor, 
and most importantly as a powerful leader as he/she crosses traditional functional 
boundaries. It is however doubtful whether the typical German manager can quickly 
adapt to the requirements of a leader in a reengineered firm. In many ways, this 
notion of the manager as an inspirational leader is characteristic of the American ideal 
of the manager as an entrepreneur and cultural hero. In any case the concept of 
management as both a profession and an academic discipline is inherently American, 
whereas in German the term der Manager does not quite command the same level of 
respect or status. In the German cultural context, it is in fact the engineer or technical 
specialist who is more likely to fulfil this leadership role (Hofstede, 1993, 79). As a 
matter of fact the concept of a strong, forceful leader or Fiihrer is not all that popular 
given certain historical resonances. 
One should not lose sight of the fact that perhaps the highly responsible 
German workers do not desperately need an American-style leader to motivate them 
(Hofstede, 1996, 80). In Germany, “the system” is seen as being more important 
than the leader with the leader assuming the role as administering that system. 
Consequently, many German companies still have rigid management processes which 
can make them inflexible (Kluge et al., 1996) particularly in today’s business 
environment 
In Germany much emphasis is placed upon technical expertise, qualifications 
and capability and mangers tend very much to be experts in their own specialist fields 
(Salz-Trautmann, 1994, 33; Lawrence 1980; Warner and Campbell 1993, 97). This 
trend is particularly noticeable among the larger organisations and Konzerne. In fact, 
the pre-eminent position of specialists such as engineers and lawyers with doctoral 
degrees in the top echelons of German management reflects this orientation (Warner 
and Campbell, 1993, 97; Ogger 1992, 134). Although the academic credentials of 
these individuals are not in doubt, practical business acumen and general management 
skills do not necessarily accompany their technical expertise. Consequently, one of 
German management’s most vocal critics terms the captains of German industry 
“ivory tower academics” (Ogger 1992, 134). 
Of particular interest is Waadt’s study of German management, which 
specifically assesses the skills of German managers in light of the needs and 
requirements of the business reengineering philosophy. This study claims that 
German managers are reluctant to delegate responsibility, motivate and maximise the 
potential of their work-force. In agreement with the findings of many other studies, 
German managers rely very much upon an authority-based and, in particular 
paternalistic leadership style, with clear lines of responsibility and avoid conflict, risk 
and criticism if at all possible (Berghahn, 1985; Hofstede, 1996; Myers et al, 1995, 
21; Vogl, 1973, 97). Once more it becomes doubtful whether German managers can 
deal with the risk and ambiguity inherent to the “Management by Objectives” style 
orientation associated with business reengineering. In general, German managers are 
very much activists or operators with large spans of control yet weak on task 
delegation which is also central to the reengineering paradigm. Waadt concludes that 
the deficiencies and weaknesses of German management could well endanger the 
potential success of reengineering projects. 
However, much of the apparent weaknesses in the German management style 
can perhaps be accounted for by the lack of interest in formal American-style 
management education. This is evident in the apparent absence of American-style 
business schools such as INSEAD or the London Business School and the relatively 
low rating of the MBA qualification (Randlesome, 1994, 153; Vogl, 1973, 63-64). 
Moreover, the teaching style of German universities is much more theoretical- 
oriented than in the Anglo-Saxon world. This applies in particular to the discipline of 
Betriebswirtschaftdehre or business administration where little emphasis is placed 
upon the acquisition of general management skills and the development of 
interpersonal skills. 
Fortunately, German managers are becoming increasingly aware that they 
should keep abreast with the latest in management development as many future 
managers are beginning to address this problem as they endeavour to improve and 
update their management style and try to acquire a broader repertoire of management 
and interpersonal skills (Salz-Trautmann, 1994, 33; Lane 1989, 46).25 In fact, in direct 
reference to the challenges posed by business reengineering, the chairman of Siemens 
AG supervisory board Hermann Franz admitted “what we currently lack is the ability 
to guide the change process” (Authors translation; quoted in Schmalenbach 
Telegramm). 
In this context the practical advantages of the MBA over the Doctor title are 
however slowly being recognised as an increasing number of ambitious German 
managers are currently studying for the MBA qualification abroad (Randlesome 
1994, 155). Also, a small number of German academic institutions such as WHU 
Koblenz and the Europa Business College in Munich have recently begun to promote 
their own international MBA-programmes as the view of management as a distinct 
“profession” spreads to Germany. Apparently, the international outlook, decisiveness 
and task-orientation developed during an MBA programme is much more relevant to 
management and leadership in a reengineered organisation. One should not however 
lose sight of the fact that management is as much a practical craft as a science or 
profession and that formal qualifications such as an MBA is by no means a guarantee 
of effective management.2h 
In regard to future managers, a young manager is regarded as a tautology in Germany. A man-ager 
must have the age of a “man” and not a “boy”, not to speak of a “girl”. 
lo In a recent article, Henry Mintzberg quoted a recent US study which noted that those individuals 
referred to by their peers as being ‘good’ managers either had no qualifications at all or had Ph.Ds 
(Minztberg 1996). 
Two interesting examples of the new type of management style can however 
already be found in traditional German industry. The century-old role of the German 
Meister or factory supervisor could well serve as a role model for line managers in a 
reengineered environment. In an extremely flexible and multi-functional role, the 
Meister solves technical problems on the factory floor as well as dealing with a 
number of managerial, organisational and personnel-related responsibilities (Lane 
1989, 46). Likewise many of the owner managers in the Mittelstand also embody 
exemplary management and leadership styles. These owner managers are technically 
highly proficient yet also spend much of their time motivating and empowering 
workers. Acting as true leaders they are able to obtain the maximum output from 
employees by imbuing a strong sense of loyalty and granting their workers much 
autonomy. 
Reward and Promotion Systems: Inappropriate Traditions? 
As a result of the renewed orientation upon value-creating processes, 
teamwork and customer satisfaction, innovative incentive systems become 
imperative. In a reengineered firm employees are to be rewarded according to their 
net contribution to the value creating process and not on the basis of working hours, 
seniority or other traditional measures. In theory, this may well result in a reduction 
in the earnings differential between white collar and blue collar workers. 
Significantly, this distinction is less noticeable in Germany than in other 
industrialised nations (Hickson and Pugh, 1995, 102). 
However, salaries and wages are traditionally only loosely related to 
performance in German companies. Astonishingly, in the past it has been very 
difficult to fire a person with over ten years’ service. In any cultural environment, it 
may prove difficult to introduce such a remuneration model in practice. These 
difficulties are accentuated in the German context given the traditional resistance to 
change and risk-taking. Furthermore, in order to introduce such new measures the co- 
operation and approval of the unions and works council (Betriebsrat) is invariably 
required in Germany. Unfortunately, trade unions though not thoroughly 
uncooperative, have generally been extremely sceptical of such new reward systems. 
The centrally negotiated German wage agreements have traditionally been extremely 
inflexible (Lehner, 1992, 91; Wobbe 1992, 42) and this might make a movement to 
these new systems more difficult. 
Similarly, Germany’s traditional vertical career ladders or the so-called 
Kuminkarriere, common in hierarchical organisations, might prove difficult to 
reconcile with the less predictable personnel policy and promotion models with 
horizontal movement and job rotation as proposed by most reengineering gurus. 
Career planning is certainly more difficult in a reengineered environment. These 
difficulties are likely to be amplified by Germany’s strong aversion to risk and 
ambiguity. Consequently, reengineered firms, pursuing this personnel policy might 
even have difficulties attracting the best available talent (Drumm 1995b, 12). 
An increasing number of German firms have however realised that new 
remuneration and reward systems are required to replace the outdated and inflexible 
models which have dominated German industry for decades. For example, piece 
rates, so common in the production halls of many companies are being replaced by 
new reward systems which place far more emphasis upon teamwork and co-operation. 
A new remuneration model at Audi AG, for example, tries to reward flexible team 
players and encourage the acquisition of multifaceted skills by rewarding team 
members according to the number of different production tasks which they can 
master. Similarly, Opel and Porsche encourage teams which make valuable 
suggestions for the improvement of the production process. Significantly, many of 
Simon’s “Hidden Champions” of the German Mittelstund have, for many years, had 
incentives in place whereby a significant portion of the financial rewards is 
performance-related (Simon 1992). 
According to a recent study managers are also experiencing a reengineering of 
their pay packets. Many executives are now being rewarded with a salary premium of 
up to 25% for their contribution to decisive strategic projects. Similarly, board 
members of many of Germany’s largest groups such as Daimler Benz and Deutsche 
Bank are being granted stock options in an effort to forge a closer link between pay 
and performance. 
What we are witnessing in Germany is the replacement of traditional practices 
of reward and promotion with more flexible and dynamic approaches which are more 
in line with the behavioural changes necessary to implement a reengineering 
programme successfully. 
The implementation of business reengineering in Germany 
According to a study conducted by the German consultancy Droege & 
Company at the beginning of 1993 75% of German enterprises wish to adopt a strict 
process-oriented organisational structure. However, at that point only 4% of the 
surveyed companies had actually initiated business reengineering-programmes 
(anonymous, 1993). It was however not until the following year that business 
reengineering concepts gradually begin to filter through to the German business press 
and be actively promoted by the leading American-pioneered consultancies. 
A 1994 study initiated by the Department of Information Technology at the 
University of Berne in Switzerland established that business reengineering concepts 
were gradually gaining in popularity and prominence in Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland. Despite the fact that 18% of the surveyed IT specialists did not possess 
any knowledge of the concept, 39% claimed to be actively involved in the planning or 
implementation of business reengineering projects. Conducted a year later than the 
Droege & Company study these findings certainly suggest that the business 
reengineering bandwagon was gathering momentum at this point. Interestingly this 
survey also suggests that business reengineering programmes were most popular in 
the financial services and electronic engineering sectors. 
A few months later, in a third study, the business consultancy BPU and the 
faculty of organisation studies at the Ludwig-Maximilianer University in Munich 
ascertained that the profile of Reengineering concepts was extremely high among the 
larger enterprises (turnover > DM 3 Billion). The findings indicate that 81% of the 
senior managers in the surveyed large companies claimed to be implementing 
reengineering principles in their businesses. Box 1 describes how some German 
companies have implemented some of the key principles of business reengineering. 
Box 1 Case studies of re-engineering in German companies. 
This box provides an overview as to how some of the key principles of the 
reengineering philosophy have been put into practice by certain German 
companies. Significantly this selection provides valuable insights into both 
successful as well as failed reengineering projects as well as providing an 
understanding of the experiences with reengineering from three different 
business sectors. In contrast to many euphemistically-termed reengineering 
projects, a rationalisation or downsizing was not the primary aim of these 
programmes. Naturally, no organisation implemented every single 
reengineering principle word for word or step for step as outlined in the 
reengineering cookbooks. Instead these companies used certain useful 
reengineering principles in order to improve their organisational performance 
and for the pursuit of certain strategic goals. 
Reengineering Production Facilities at Porsche AG 
At the beginning of the 1990s faced with rapidly changing customer 
requirements, increased foreign competition and world-wide recession Porsche 
found itself in the midst of crisis. After posting record losses in 1993 Porsche 
was widely touted as an acquisition target for a number of foreign competitors. 
In view of these difficulties Porsche decided to introduce a number of 
reengineering principles and concepts to its production facility in order to 
restore the prestigious car manufacturer to profitability and preserve its 
autonomy. 
Applying reengineering principles 
This project in many ways epitomises the need for an effective two-way 
communication process with both top-down and bottom-up communication 
flows. Initially the top management committee or Vorstund ensured that all 
senior managers were firmly committed to the project before its inception. 
Instead of an exclusive top-down aggressive approach, employees at all levels 
of the organisation were actively encouraged to participate in, and contribute to, 
the programme. 
As a result of these communications ambitious yet attainable and realistic 
targets were agreed upon. The reengineering programme focused upon a small 
number of core production processes considered crucial to Porsche’s core 
competencies. In accordance with the new organisational architecture Porsche 
established a number of PVP-Teams or Porsche Improvement (Verbesserungs) 
Process teams on the factory floor as well as task forces and project teams at 
management level. A prime example of the success of these multi-functional 
teams manifested itself in the dramatic reduction of the development cycle of 
the new 986 model. Multi-disciplinary teams drew upon and integrated the 
expertise of managers from the areas of production, purchasing, finance and 
marketing. Furthermore, it was acknowledged that some of the core processes 
transcend organisational boundaries. Hence, co-operation and communication 
with suppliers were increased which resulted in significant improvements in the 
supply process and lower sourcing costs. 
As outlined above, Porsche realised that the human element is crucial to the 
success of any change management project. In order to empower employees for 
their new more challenging roles more than 17,000 man-hours were invested in 
employee training and development. 
Significantly, Porsche did not rely solely upon business reengineering 
concepts for their organisational renewal. Instead Porsche successfully 
integrated many of the best available techniques in management practice for the 
transformation of their production facilities. In the planning and analysis stage 
an extensive benchmarking with leading Japanese car manufacturers was 
undertaken. Similarly, recognising that change and improvement is a 
continuous and on-going process rather than a once-off event, Kaizen and TQM 
projects began to reinforce and cement the process improvements achieved by 
the initial reengineering programme. This integration of different management 
techniques underlines that business reengineering is by no means a cure-all 
which can overnight restore an organisation to profitability. 
Porsche’s reengineering programme seems to have made an all-important 
contribution to the company’s recovery. The company has returned to profit, 
largely due to savings in production costs and significant reductions in both 
product development and production times. 
Reengineering and restructuring at Daimler Benz HQ 
In January of 1993 the Daimler Benz Holding company began an all- 
embracing large scale reengineering project with the primary aim of achieving a 
long-lasting cultural transformation. This ambitious project is very significant 
since it is one of the few well documented reengineering projects which failed 
to live up to its expectations. 
At that point the corporate headquarters was no longer effectively fulfilling 
its strategic role within the Daimler Benz group of providing the various 
business units with an effective service and adding value to the Daimler Benz 
group. The organisation was firmly built upon functional lines with seven 
different layers of management and bureaucracy. It was estimated that this 
structure led to the corporate decision making process lasting an average of 
approximately nine months. This cumbersome organisational structure clearly 
did not suit the challenge of the 1990s. 
Daimler attempted to integrate both top-down and bottom-up approaches to 
communication and change. Numerous forums and round table discussions 
were introduced in order to encourage communication between all levels of the 
organisation. Performance-oriented salaries were introduced and status 
symbols and perks abolished in order to help develop the new corporate culture. 
Furthermore, as part of the new entrepreneurial culture employees experienced 
more empowerment and middle managers were given a much broader span of 
control. Similarly cross-functional task forces and consulting groups were 
established to reinforce the cultural change. 
However, in reality it emerged that the communication process was less 
democratic than intended which in turn resulted in the lack of broad-based 
company-wide support. For example, in many cases managers did not actually 
condone the abolition of titles, status symbols and perks. This resulted in fear 
and resistance which rendered the transformation of the old bureaucratic culture 
an intractable task. Despite the flatter hierarchical structure the deep-seated 
bureaucratic approach and slowness in decision making could not be 
significantly improved as the old Daimler culture continued to overshadow the 
new management structure. 
During the period of study this particular reengineering project could not 
live up to its expected success. After one year only 3% of the programme had 
been completed. This underlines that business reengineering is certainly not a 
quick fix to organisational ills and highlights the difficult and often intractable 
problems which can be associated with the rapid reengineering of a deep-rooted 
corporate culture. Resistance and fear on the part of the risk-averse 
management and employees as well as the lack of a truly democratic 
communication process proved the greatest stumbling blocks in this project. 
One could equally criticise top management for its failure to provide credible 
leadership in the period of transformation and transition. 
Siemens Nixdorf Service 
Siemens Nixdorf Service which installs and maintains the computer 
hardware and software of its customers was still reporting healthy profits at the 
beginning of the 1990s. However, in view of increased foreign competition 
management feared the realisation of predicted losses by 1995. The aim of the 
following reengineering project was to reengineer the customer service process 
in order to optimise customer responsiveness and cost effectiveness. 
Up to 1991 Siemens Nixdorf Customer Service operated with thirty 
different support centres scattered throughout Germany. Each centre employed 
a large number of technicians and specialist service engineers. In the case of a 
customer problem, a technician would travel to the customer, identify the 
problem, return to the centre and fetch the necessary equipment and parts before 
actually resolving the problem. This awkward and inefficient procedure 
resulted in the resolution of customer requests lasting an average of two days. 
Only 12% of all service problems could be solved over the telephone. 
Furthermore, each subsidiary employed a BS 2000 mainframe specialist even 
though only a handful of BS 2000 enquiries were dealt with each week. 
Restructuring of Customer Service process according to reengineering 
principles 
The ten-person redesign team reduced the number of service centres from 
thirty to five and introduced a regional management structure. These enlarged 
subsidiaries were thought to represent an optimum combination of 
centralisation and decentralisation of resources. The service centres are 
sufficiently large to combine enough expertise to deal with all customer 
problems. At the same time they were distributed throughout Germany in order 
to guarantee a speedy and flexible repair service for all customers. The 
servicing process became significantly faster and more efficient as in 
approximately 80% of the enquires an expert can diagnose the problem on the 
telephone and have spare parts delivered immediately. 
Core Elements 
Crucial to the success of this programme was the replacement of 2 
hierarchical levels by a new team-oriented management structure which can 
react far quicker to customer needs. Furthermore, the IT-system which tracks 
customer service requests and supports the logistics of the new replacement part 
delivery system proved itself a key “enabler” of the programme. Moreover, 
new measurement and incentives were introduced in order to foster a customer- 
oriented culture which focuses upon the speedy resolution of customer 
problems. Of prime importance to the programme’s success was the successful 
synergy of a top down approach with consensus-oriented bottom up 
communication. Project manager, Gerhard Radkte, showed exemplary 
leadership qualities and persuasive powers as he relied upon open and honest 
communication with the whole organisation and the trade union. 
As expected the initially sceptical top management board and the powerful 
IG Metal1 union mounted significant resistance until the success of a pilot 
project in Frankfurt convinced them of the project’s merits. After this political 
resistance had been overcome the project benefited from a relatively broad base 
of support throughout the organisation. 
Customer servicing process times were reduced considerably and significant 
improvements in costs and profit performance were achieved. Following the 
successful reengineering of the Customer Service Process other American-style 
management techniques have been implemented in the Siemens Nixdorf group. 
However the group as a whole only returned to profit in 1995 following five 
consecutive years of loss-making. Clearly reengineering principles are not a 
quick fix or patent solution for an organisation suffering from competitive 
disadvantage. 
Source: cases compiled from various sources including business magazines, reports in 
newspapers, and academic journal articles. 
Closing remarks 
Business-engineering does have a powerful message and it is that by focusing 
on processes, organisations have the opportunity to significantly improve their 
performance. Driven by the advent of new information technologies, a myriad of new 
possibilities for organising work open up; in essence technology enables work to be 
performed in ways which are not possible manually. Yet, not only must cognisance 
must be taken of the wider organisational implications of adopting a process 
perspective but due regard must also be given to the cultural context of business and 
management. 
This paper has examined the transferability of the concept of business 
reengineering in the context of the German business environment. It has established 
that by taking sufficient cognisance of specific cultural and organisational 
circumstances certain reengineering principles can be successfully applied to German 
enterprises. Others may need to be refined somewhat before they can be incorporated 
within any change programme. Table 1 maps the key elements of business 
reengineering against the key traits of the Germanic cultural context. If there is a 
lesson it is that an appreciation of the cultural subtleties is a basic requirement for the 
success of any change management initiative. Yet this is a lesson which should have 
been learned a long time ago and one which is likely to be re-learned in the future. 
Reengineering is, however, by no means a panacea for organisational ills and 
any organisation considering implementing a business reengineering initiative must 
be fully aware of the likely costs, benefits and risk. In fact many successful German 
firms, particularly in the Mittelstund may have no need for reengineering in the 
radical form as advocated by some.27 However, using business re-engineering to cut 
costs alone may not be enough and in certain industries German companies do need to 
become more innovative (Kluge et al., 1996). 
The increased openness of German firms to new management techniques in 
recent years can only benefit German management in the long run. By the same 
token, German management should never relinquish its discerning and considered 
approach to the applicability of foreign management philosophies. New ideas and 
concepts can be a catalyst for question fundamental assumptions and beliefs about 
organisation and management. The practice of management is not static and new 
ideas offer potential opportunities. These should be tempered by many factors, 
particularly cultural context. Even at a macro level business and economic practices 
should be constantly re-evaluated. For example, the Soziule Murktwirtschuft, a 
cornerstone of the German economic miracle, is now coming under increasing 
pressure and its applicability in its current form in todays global economy is being 
questionned. 
In the broader context, the culture-bound view of management is valid to a 
certain extent. However given sufficient cultural sensitivity and consideration certain 
management philosophies can be successfully transferred outside their own cultural 
birthplace. A recent paper examining BPR in China concluded that while Hammer 
and Champy (1993) contended that ‘tradition counts for nothing’ (Martinson, 1996, 
49), the Confucian tradition of that country will constrain the implementation of 
radical reforms. The argument is that reengineering, in its “pure” form, would require 
an unprecedented overhaul of fundamental Chinese values. 
An interesting starting point for future research would be to explore whether a 
transfer of management techniques in the reverse direction - from Europe to the US 
In a five-year study of mid-sized firms in Germany, the top performers had growth rates four times 
higher, productivity 25% greater, and return on sales three times higher than those of their weakest 
competitors. These leading firms produced a narrow range of products, sold to fewer customers, 
and had fewer supliers. They have decentralised organisational structures, simpler and faster 
processes, and a more concentrated focus on R&D investment, logistics and location structure 
(Rommel et al., 1995). 
might work. Certainly many firms on the other side of the Atlantic could do far 
worse than analyse the strengths of the German MitteZstund.2R 
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Radical nature must be played down 
Resistance to radical change I conservative values 
Deep seated desire for stability and security 
But Germans are becoming open-minded to new 
management methods 
Likely protracted implementation due to co-determination 
General lack of customer focus 
Phenomenon of ‘overengineering’ of products 
Product rather than market orientation must be addressed 
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Legacy of process structure in German management 
theory 
German firms in general low on horizontal and vertical 
differentiation and have a relatively flat hierarchical 
structure 
Collective society with low power-distance should 
encourage teamwork and empowerment 
Well educated work-force cherishes empowerment 
Delegation of authority abounds with low power-distance 
Bottom-up approach necessary due to co-determination 
and strength of trade unions 
Co-determination can act as a powerful vehicle for 
organisational change 
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Deficiencies in German management: poor motivators, 
leaders and mentors 
Perhaps too specialised and weak on soft skills 
Deficiencies are slowly being addressed 
Prepared to undertake responsibility 
Well educated and highly qualified 
But is dual system too inflexible? 
Problems in the form of traditional career planning and its 
vertical movement 
Inflexible wage structure 
However, performance related pay becoming popular 
Table 1 Summary of key tenets of reengineering mapped against German cultural 
context. 
lx Italy also has a class of media industria, a network of medium-sized exporters that have been 
growing fast. Key attributes of these companies are specialisation and flexibility and a network of 
small suppliers. 
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